GAO-21-463T; Published: Mar 24, 2021. Publicly Released: Mar 24, 2021.
Despite congressional oversight and the Department of Defense’s actions to implement more than 100 GAO recommendations, reports of sexual assault in the military continue to rise.
Our prior work has shown that focusing on sexual assault prevention and addressing the needs of certain populations (e.g., male servicemember victims and DOD civilian employees) could help to further address the issue. DOD has largely focused on responding to incidents of sexual assault rather than preventing them.
We testified that continued DOD leadership attention can help ensure that our recommendations are addressed to prevent sexual assault in the military.
What GAO Found
In the National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAA) from fiscal years 2004 to 2019, based on GAO’s preliminary analysis, Congress enacted 249 statutory requirements related to sexual assault prevention and response in the military to assist the Department of Defense (DOD) with its efforts in this area. These statutory requirements covered a number of different areas. For example, they required annual reports on sexual assaults at the military service academies and within the armed forces to aid oversight, and the establishment of training and certification programs for sexual assault response coordinators and victim advocates. Although the requirements cover a wide range of activities, GAO found that they generally related to two broad categories: (1) victim assistance and advocacy, and (2) management and oversight. A smaller percentage of requirements were related to prevention efforts (see figure).
Categories of 249 Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Statutory Requirements in the National Defense Authorization Acts, Fiscal Years 2004-2019
While DOD has taken a number of steps to address sexual assault, GAO’s prior work has shown that there are areas in which DOD can focus to further address the issue. With the exception of some more recent initiatives, the department’s efforts have been largely focused on responding to, rather than preventing, incidents of sexual assault. For example, GAO found that the department had not fully developed performance measures to assess the effectiveness of sexual assault prevention efforts and make changes when needed, and recommended that it do so. Recent DOD efforts in this area, in addition to continued congressional oversight and the implementation of prior GAO recommendations, could help DOD reduce the incidence of sexual assault. Further, additional actions are needed to strengthen DOD’s efforts to address the needs of male servicemembers who have been sexually assaulted and the needs of DOD’s workforce of nearly 900,000 civilian employees with regard to prevention and response. For example, GAO found that DOD was not tracking all reported work-related sexual assaults involving civilian employees and recommended that it issue guidance to help ensure more comprehensive tracking.
Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act; Chair Jerome H. Powell Before the Committee on Financial Services, House of Representatives
Federal Reserve Chair Jerome H. Powell, Before the Committee on Financial Services, US House of Representatives
Testimony
Chairwoman Waters, Ranking Member McHenry, and other members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss the measures we have taken to address the hardship wrought by the pandemic.
I would like to start by noting the upcoming one-year anniversary of the CARES Act (Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act). With unanimous approval, Congress provided by far the fastest and largest response to any postwar economic downturn, offering fiscal support for households, businesses, health-care providers, and state and local governments. This historically important legislation provided critical support in our nation’s hour of need. As the virus arrived in force, our immediate challenge was to limit the severity and duration of the fallout to avoid longer-run damage. At the Fed, we also acted with unprecedented speed and force, using the full range of policy tools at our disposal.
Today the situation is much improved. While the economic fallout has been real and widespread, the worst was avoided by swift and vigorous action — from Congress and the Federal Reserve, from across government and cities and towns, and from individuals, communities, and the private sector. More people held on to their jobs, more businesses kept their doors open, and more incomes were saved. But the recovery is far from complete, so, at the Fed, we will continue to provide the economy the support that it needs for as long as it takes.
As we have emphasized throughout the pandemic, the path of the economy continues to depend on the course of the virus. Since January, the number of new cases, hospitalizations, and deaths has fallen, and ongoing vaccinations offer hope for a return to more normal conditions later this year. In the meantime, continued social distancing and mask wearing will help us reach that goal.
Indicators of economic activity and employment have turned up recently. Household spending on goods has risen notably so far this year, although spending on services remains low, especially in sectors that typically require in-person gatherings. The housing sector has more than fully recovered from the downturn, while business investment and manufacturing production have also picked up.
As with overall economic activity, conditions in the labor market have recently improved. Employment rose by 379,000 in February, as the leisure and hospitality sector recouped about two-thirds of the jobs it lost in December and January.
The recovery has progressed more quickly than generally expected and looks to be strengthening. This is due in significant part to the unprecedented fiscal and monetary policy actions I mentioned, which provided essential support to households, businesses, and communities.
However, the sectors of the economy most adversely affected by the resurgence of the virus, and by greater social distancing, remain weak, and the unemployment rate — still elevated at 6.2 percent — underestimates the shortfall, particularly as labor market participation remains notably below pre-pandemic levels.
We welcome this progress, but will not lose sight of the millions of Americans who are still hurting, including lower-wage workers in the services sector, African Americans, Hispanics, and other minority groups that have been especially hard hit.
The Scout Report: Civil Rights Toolkit; Be All Write; Plants Are Cool, Too; NextStrain; Women’n Art; 500 Years of Women In British Art
THEME: WOMEN IN FILM AND ART |
|||||||||
|
|||||||||
|
|||||||||
|
|||||||||
|
|||||||||
|
|||||||||
TECH TOOLS |
|||||||||
|
|||||||||
|
|||||||||
REVISITED |
|||||||||
|
|||||||||
The Scout Report (ISSN 1092-3861) is published every Friday of the year except for the Fridays after Christmas and New Years by the Internet Scout Research Group, based in the University of Wisconsin-Madison’s Department of Computer Sciences.
Current Issue · Back Issues · Copyright © 2021 Internet Scout Research Group – http://scout.wisc.edu
The Internet Scout Research Group, located in the Computer Sciences Department at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, provides Internet publications and software to the research and education communities under grants from the National Science Foundation, the Andrew W. Mellon foundation, and other philanthropic organizations. Users may make and distribute verbatim copies of any of Internet Scout’s publications or web content, provided this paragraph, including the above copyright notice, is preserved on all copies.
GAO: Transportation Safety: DOT Has Taken Steps to Verify and Publicize Drug and Alcohol Testing Data But Should Do More
* GAO-21-296
Published: Mar 17, 2021. Publicly Released: Mar 17, 2021.
Note: SeniorWomen.com congratulates the 100 years of GAO:
https://www.gao.gov/about/what-gao-does/hundred-years-of-gao
Highlights
What GAO Found
Federal regulations require employers in the different transportation industries to: (1) randomly test their safety-sensitive employees for drugs or alcohol, or both, and (2) certify and report the aggregate data annually or when requested to the Department of Transportation (DOT). The DOT modal administrations and the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) primarily use these data to determine the annual random testing rate (the specified minimum percentage of these employees that employers use to calculate the minimum number of random tests they must conduct that year). For example, for drugs, if 1 percent or more of employees in an industry randomly test positive, then the following year’s random testing rate will be set at 50 percent.
DOT, the modal administrations, and USCG have taken steps to ensure that drug and alcohol testing data reported by employers are reliable:
- DOT incorporated automated checks to alert employers that the data they are submitting are outside of expected ranges and may be inaccurate.
- After data are reported, the modal administrations and USCG use varying processes to verify data, e.g., some compare data employers reported to physical records during routine compliance reviews.
These data verification processes improve the reliability of the data, but are not consistently used by each of the modal administrations and USCG. Officials have the discretion to use different data reliability processes and may have valid reasons for doing so. However, officials have not evaluated the sufficiency of these various processes and therefore do not have adequate assurance the data are reliable for calculating the random testing rates.
Laboratory Urinalysis for Drug Testing
In March 2019, DOT published aggregated drug and alcohol testing data on its website, as required. This website, updated annually, follows several key actions for transparently reporting government data, but does not follow other key actions, including:
- DOT has not disclosed known data limitations that exist in the public data that would prevent users from accurately calculating the random testing rate.
- DOT has not engaged with the public to encourage data use.
DOT officials told us there is limited interest in the data based on website traffic. However, because DOT has not taken steps to inform the public of the data, DOT may be missing opportunities to identify additional users and improvements.
Why GAO Did This Study
Since 1988, DOT has regulated the process by which employers in the different transportation industries (aviation, trucking, rail, transit, pipeline, and maritime) are required to test their employees for drug and alcohol use. Employers must self-report these test results annually to DOT or when requested by DOT. In a 2018 statute, Congress required DOT to publish the aggregate drug and alcohol testing data on DOT’s website and included a provision for GAO to review the website and these data.
This report examines: (1) how DOT uses drug and alcohol testing data, (2) how DOT verifies that data are reliable, and (3) whether DOT follows key actions for transparently reporting drug and alcohol testing data. GAO reviewed relevant laws and regulations, among other things. To determine how DOT verifies that data are reliable, GAO reviewed documents, analyzed data in the internal database from calendar years 2003 through 2018, and interviewed DOT officials. GAO also reviewed the public website and compared it to key actions for open government data.
Recommendations
GAO is making several recommendations, including that DOT (1) evaluate the processes the modal administrations use to verify testing data, (2) disclose known limitations in the website’s publicly reported testing data, and (3) reach out to the public to promote the website and evaluate the benefits and costs of other possible improvements. DOT concurred with our recommendations.
Recommendations for Executive Action
| Agency Affected | Recommendation | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Department of Transportation | 1. The Secretary of Transportation should direct the Administrators of FAA, FMCSA, FRA, FTA, and PHMSA to: (1) evaluate the different processes used by each modal administration to verify drug and alcohol testing data; including comparing data to records during inspections, checking data for errors manually or with software, and contacting employers that do not submit a report or submit an incomplete report; and (2) determine what, if any, additional steps should be taken to improve the reliability of the information. (Recommendation 1) |
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
|
| United States Coast Guard | 2. The Commandant of the Coast Guard should direct the Assistant Commandant for Prevention Policy to: (1) evaluate the different processes used by USCG to verify drug and alcohol testing dataincluding comparing data to records during inspections, checking data for errors manually or with software, and contacting employers that do not submit a report or submit an incomplete reportand (2) determine what, if any, additional steps should be taken to improve the reliability of the information. (Recommendation 2) |
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
|
| Office of Drug and Alcohol Policy and Compliance | 3. The Director of ODAPC should disclose known limitations of drug and alcohol testing data on DOT’s website, consistent with key actions for open government data. (Recommendation 3) |
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
|
| Office of Drug and Alcohol Policy and Compliance | 4. The Director of ODAPC should reach out to potential users in the public to determine if there is a broader audience for the public data, consistent with key actions for open government data, and if a broader audience is identified, engage with users to evaluate the benefits and costs of adopting additional key actions for open government data and any other possible improvements to the website. (Recommendation 4) |
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
|
*About:
Center for Democracy and Technology Report: Facts and Their Discontents: A Research Agenda for Online Disinformation, Race, and Gender
February 11, 2021 /
Executive Summary
The January 6th attack on the U.S. Capitol demonstrated how online disinformation can have severe offline consequences. For some time, the problems and possible impacts on democracy caused by online mis- and dis-information have dominated public policy discussions and thus research about these topics has developed rapidly in the last few years. Many disinformation campaigns are specifically designed with racist and/or misogynistic content, suggesting that disinformation is a tool used to promote ideologies like white supremacy and patriarchy.
Some civil society groups have already engaged in work to understand and address the impacts of mis- and disinformation on communities of color and across gender identity. Unfortunately, there is still not a lot of scholarship among many traditional research organizations (e.g., universities, think tanks, policy centers, etc.) that looks at patterns and impacts on people of color, women, LGBTQIA+ communities, and other voices that are less prominent in mainstream political discourse in the U.S.
In September 2020, CDT brought together an interdisciplinary and international group of experts to share and discuss research on this issue. This report presents some of those ideas and builds upon them to identify key research opportunities, including important unresolved questions around the intersections of online disinformation, race, and gender. This report also makes recommendations for how to tackle the related methodological and technical problems that researchers and others face in addressing these topics. This is important in generating research that will be directly relevant for developing policy solutions to address disinformation.
What We Know About Online Disinformation in General
- Producers of misinformation are motivated by different incentives, including political ideology, money, and status/attention.
- The methods and tools for spreading disinformation include social media, memes, and bots. Producers of disinformation also target journalists and influencers to amplify their false messages.
- Disinformation is designed to meet the demand for compelling and evocative content. A key feature of disinformation is that it commands people’s limited attention and potential engagement, including their capacity to share content with others. Novel content that presents false information in new and unique ways is more likely to be shared.
- People who share false information are more likely to be part of online polarized communities, which act as echo chambers and limit members’ exposure to alternative viewpoints that would counter disinformation.
What We Know About Online Disinformation, Race, and Gender
- From the few studies that do exist, we can say that:
- There were racially targeted disinformation campaigns aimed at suppressing votes from communities of color in the last three major elections in the U.S.
- Tactics include the use of “digital blackface/brownface,” where disinformation operatives representing themselves as African American activists attracted more online engagement than any other identity category.
- Spanish-speaking communities lack trusted sources that speak directly to them, and Latinx-oriented news outlets do not typically provide much information about American political candidates. This makes it easier for bad actors to spread disinformation unchallenged.
- Content moderation practices are not nearly as advanced or robust for Spanish-language content, or content in any other language besides English.
- Gendered disinformation campaigns promote the narrative that women are not good political leaders, and often aim to undermine women political leaders by spreading false information about their qualifications, experience, and intelligence, sometimes using sexualized imagery as part of their tactics.
- Women of color may be more likely to be the subject of disinformation when compared to others.
Major Research Gaps and Opportunities
- More work is needed on the definition and measurement of disinformation. A focus on race, gender, and intersectionality can help address this, possibly by improving how we assess impact and harm.
- We still lack evidence of the impact of disinformation on things like electoral outcomes, political opinions, and trust in political institutions, including where such disinformation is about or targeted at people based on race and gender.
- We need to better understand the needs of communities where information verification is currently more difficult or where data voids may exist, such as in Spanish-speaking communities.
- Understanding how disinformation leverages false narratives based on racism and/or misogyny may also improve efforts to counter disinformation, particularly as fact-checking alone may fall short.
- Key questions include: How can we better measure the degree and methods of coordination between different actors (organic or otherwise) who may be involved in a disinformation campaign? To what extent is coordination maintained through shared views of patriarchy and/or white supremacy?
- How can research better capture and understand the fluidity between misinformation and disinformation, particularly if these patterns vary across and within groups based on race, gender, and other factors?
Why These Research Gaps Are Important
Disinformation campaigns often rely on exploiting existing narratives of discrimination (e.g., mysoginistic views) or narratives that stem from historical discrimination (e.g., views within some African American communities about the criminal justice system) to build credibility for the false information being shared. By not sufficiently examining this feature, we may be missing the point of disinformation campaigns, which are sometimes intentionally designed to exploit existing forms of discrimination and often target people based on race, gender identity, or both.
The public policy stakes are too high to ignore the impacts on communities that together make up far more than half the U.S. population. Governments, industry, and civil society are understandably concerned and are hastily putting forward policy and legislative proposals, but without the comprehensive kinds of evidence that we call for, these solutions may fall short and could likely harm the same communities they aim to protect. We can start by building this body of evidence and taking advantage of the research opportunities described in this report.
Read the accompanying press release here.
Read more from report authors Dhanaraj & DeVan here.
This was last updated February 17, 2021.
CDT works to strengthen individual rights and freedoms by defining, promoting, and influencing technology policy and the architecture of the internet that impacts our daily lives.
The content throughout this website that originates with CDT can be freely copied and used as long as you make no substantive changes and clearly give us credit. More on CDT’s content reuse policy is available here.